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Two ex ante identically informed agents play a two-period alternating offer 
bargaining game over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous 
information acquisition and common values. Because of endogenous lemons 
problems and endogenous outside options perfect equilibria may have the 
following properties. (1) In the one period case the agent responding to a take-
it-or-leave-it offer captures the full trading surplus. (2) If the discounting of the 
trading surplus is lower than the discounting of the information cost, delay of 
agreement arises although the agents maintain symmetric information in the 
period of disagreement. (3) The equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-
monotonic in the discount factor of the trading surplus. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper analyses information acquisition in alternating offer bargaining. A risk neutral 
buyer and a risk neutral seller seek to agree on a price at which to trade an asset with a 
significant common value (quality) component. Ex ante both agents are identically informed 
about all relevant aspects of trade. In particular, it is common knowledge that a trading 
surplus exists and both agents have symmetric information about the uncertain quality of the 
asset. However, in each bargaining round prior to making an offer or a response an agent can 
acquire information about the true quality.1 
This paper focuses on two-period alternating-offer bargaining in such an environment 
and shows that perfect equilibria may have the following properties. (1) In the one period 
game the agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-it-offer captures the trading full surplus. 
Whether there is a first mover or second mover advantage in ultimatum bargaining depends 
on the information cost. (2) If the discounting of the trading surplus is lower than the 
discounting of the information cost an endogenous lemons problem causes delay of 
agreement although in the period of disagreement the agents may maintain symmetric 
information. (3) Because of endogenous outside options the equilibrium payoffs of the 
agents are non-monotonic in the discount factor δ of the trading surplus. In particular, the 
equilibrium payoff of the first period proposer can increase in δ. 
The driving force for these results is that endogenous information acquisition in a 
common values environment exerts two effects. It can cause an endogenous lemons problem 
and it implies that the outside options of the agents are endogenous. These two consequences 
give rise to a rich set of strategic considerations. It is common knowledge that the asset is 
worth v+∆ to the buyer and v−∆ to the seller where v is the uncertain common value 
component (quality) of the asset. For any quality level v, the buyer’s valuation exceeds the 
seller’s valuation by the amount 2∆ which represents the trading surplus. Ex ante both agents 
have identical information about quality, but prior to making an offer and a response they 
can acquire information about the true quality. Suppose that the buyer makes an offer in the 
first period. If the seller rejects the offer the seller makes an offer in the second period.  
                                                          
1 For example, agents trading financial assets might face common values uncertainty because of the underlying 
risky cash flow stream. In particular, in secondary markets the seller of a financial asset does not necessarily 
possess better information about the value of the asset than a potential buyer. Irrespective of asset ownership, 
any agent can spent resources to obtain information about the asset.  
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The intuition why in the one period game, perfect equilbria exist in which the agent 
responding to a take-it-or-leave-it-offer captures some or even the full trading surplus is the 
following. Suppose that the information cost c is larger than the total surplus (i.e. c>2∆) so 
that the buyer does not acquire information in equilibrium. Suppose the uninformed buyer is 
willing to give the full surplus 2∆ to the seller and proposes E[v]+∆. If the seller accepts the 
offer he gets the expected payoff 2∆. Alternatively, the seller acquires information and tries 
to exploit the buyer. If  he sees that the quality of the asset is high, he rejects the offer. If he 
sees that the quality is low, he accepts the offer. In this case the uninformed buyer suffers an 
endogenous lemons problem while the informed seller realizes the trading surplus as well as 
makes some speculative profits. However, ex ante speculation causes an opportunity cost in 
the sense that the seller forgoes some surplus because there is no trade in the high state.  
So if an uninformed buyer offers the seller the full trading surplus and if the 
information cost c is larger than the expected speculative profit π net the expected 
opportunity cost of speculation cSpec then the seller accepts the offer without information 
acquisition and gets 2∆. On the other hand if the buyer wants to capture the full trading 
surplus then the seller faces no opportunity cost of speculation. If c<π then the seller 
acquires information and speculates instead of just getting zero payoff. Therefore, if 
π−cSpec<c<π there exists a critical offer which the seller accepts without information 
acquisition. This offer must give the seller some trading surplus.  
The possibility to acquire information endows the responder with a credible threat in 
the sense of saying, that if he does no get enough trading surplus he acquires information and 
exploits the uninformed proposer. In particular, for 2∆≤c=π−cSpec, in any perfect equilibrium 
the buyer as the proposer gets zero payoff and a perfect equilibrium exists in which the seller 
as the responder to a take-it-or-leave-it-offer captures the full trading surplus. Whether there 
is a first-mover or second-mover advantage in ultimatum bargaining depends on the 
information cost. 
The argument above also shows that if the information cost is smaller than the 
speculative profit net the maximal opportunity cost of speculation, the buyer will not propose 
an offer which reflects the average quality of the asset.  Because of the endogenous lemons 
problem an uninformed buyer proposes a more defensive offer  which an uninformed seller 
does not accept. In such a case no trade occurs without information acquisition. So if  
2∆<c<π−cSpec then no equilibrium with agreement exists although the agents maintain 
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symmetric information.2 If c<min{2∆, π−cSpec}, then a least one agent acquires information 
in any trading equilibrium. 
 For the two period case, the intuition behind the waiting-to-agree result is as follows. 
Given the endogenous lemons concern, if the discounting of the trading surplus is lower than 
the discounting of the information cost then this can cause delay. Since the seller makes an 
offer in the final bargaining period he may capture the discounted trading surplus net the 
discounted information cost. Therefore, the seller rejects any offer which gives him less than 
what he can get as the proposer in the last period. Since the discounting  of the trading 
surplus is low and the discounting of the information cost is high, the net surplus in the last 
period is relatively large. In order to induce trade in the first period the buyer has to make an 
attractive offer to the seller as well as to acquire information in order to avoid the 
endogenous lemons problem. However, if the remaining surplus the buyer can capture does 
not cover the information cost the buyer does not acquire information. The best responses of 
the agents in the first period are such that no agent acquires information, the buyer account 
for the endogenous lemons problem and submits a low offer which the uninformed seller 
does not accept.  
Since the agents maintain symmetric information in the first period delay is not 
caused by signaling.3 This observation is similar to Ingersoll and Ross (1992) who derive an 
optimal waiting time argument to invest under uncertainty without strategic interactions. 
This paper proposes a kind of waiting-to-agree-result or optimal timing argument to invest in 
information subject to an endogenous lemons constraint. If information is acquired in 
equilibrium then it is efficient to delay information acquisition and trade.  
The third results states that the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic 
in the discount factor δ of the trading surplus. In particular, the equilibrium payoff of the 
                                                          
2 This no efficient trade result is neither driven by asymmetric information about the common valuation as in 
Akerlof (1970), Samuelson (1984), or Gresik (1991) nor by asymmetric information about the private valuation 
as in Myerson and Satterthwhaite (1983) but by potential asymmetric information about the common valuation 
due to endogenous information acquisition.  
3 The bargaining literature provides as a dominant reason for delay a signaling or screening story due to (actual) 
asymmetric information. Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992) show that asymmetric information 
about the private valuation of the asset can cause delay. Evans (1989) and Vincent (1989) show that 
asymmetric information about the common valuation can lead to delay, too. See also Cho (1990), Watson 
(1998), Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005), and the survey in Ausubel, et al. (2000). Fernandez and Glaser (1991) 
propose a delay story without asymmetric information. In their model a firm and an union bargain over a wage 
contract which holds for infinitely many periods (or transactions).   
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buyer (first period proposer) can increase in δ. The intuition is the following. There exist 
parameter constellations (i.e. 2δ∆<c1<π−cSpec) such that no trade occurs at all and the 
continuation payoff of the seller is zero if no agent acquires information in period 0. In 
period 0 the buyer faces a trade-off when comparing the following two alternatives.  
(a) If the buyer acquires information the continuation payoff of the seller is positive. 
Since the buyer is informed trade occurs with positive probability in period 1 and the seller 
can capture some surplus in period 1. Information acquisition exerts a positive externality. 
(b) If the buyer does not acquire information but induces the seller to acquire information in 
period 0 by just compensating him for the information cost, the buyer can keep the 
continuation payoff of the seller at zero. The uninformed buyer accounts for the lemons 
problem. In the first period trade only occurs in the low state. If there is no trade then in the 
second period the seller is informed and the surplus 2δ∆ can be realized with positive 
probability. With an appropriate offer, the buyer can capture this additional surplus in the 
first period. The seller may accept the offer because his continuation payoff is anyway zero. 
There exist parameter constellations such that the buyer chooses this alternative so that his 
payoff increases in δ. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
model. Section 3 analyzes take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining and shows that the equilibrium 
payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the information cost. Section 4 analyzes two-
period alternating offer bargaining and shows that the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are 
non-monotonic in the discounting of the trading surplus. Section 5 discusses the results as 
well as T-period alternating offer bargaining. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A and B 
contain the proofs of the Propositions.  
 
 
2.  The Model 
Two risk neutral agents play a T period alternating offer bargaining game and seek to agree 
on a price pt at which to trade an asset. It is common knowledge that the asset is worth v+∆t 
to the buyer and v−∆t to the seller in period t. 2∆t captures the differences in valuation 
between the buyer and the seller where ∆t=δt⋅∆ with δ∈[0,1] and ∆>0. v is the uncertain 
common value component (quality) which is either vL or vH with equal probability where 
vH>vL>∆. If trade occurs in period t, the surplus 2∆t is realized and UB=(v+∆t)−pt and 
US=pt−(v−∆t). If no agreement is reached until period T, the payoffs of the agents are 
normalized to zero.  
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In period t=0,2,4,.. the buyer’s action is to acquire nB(t)∈{0,1} unit of information 
and then to choose an offer b(t)∈R. The seller’s action is to acquire nS(t)∈{0,1} unit of 
information and to choose a response s(t)∈{Y,N} to b(t). If s(t)=Y, trade occurs at the price 
b(t) and the game ends. Otherwise, the next bargaining period begins. In period t=1,3,... the 
seller chooses nS(t)∈{0,1}and s(t)∈R and the buyer chooses nB(t)∈{0,1} and b(t)∈{Y,N}. If 
an agent acquires information he knows the true value v. Information acquisition is 
observable and the information cost is ct where ct≥ct+1. All actions of the agents are mutually 
observable. The solution concept is Perfect (Bayesian) Equilibrium (PE). The sequence of 
actions is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
                Period 0                   Period 1 
 
                           
                            t 
 
      v        nB(0)        b(0)      nS(0)      s(0)                      nS(1)       s(1)       nB(1)      b(1)      
  realizes   ∈{0,1}      ∈R       ∈{0,1}  ∈{Y,N}               ∈{0,1}     ∈R      ∈{0,1}   ∈{Y,N}                                    
 
 
3.  One-Period Bargaining 
This section analyzes ultimatum bargaining where the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
which the seller either accepts or rejects. Then the game ends. The Pareto optimal outcome is 
trade without costly information acquisition irrespective of how the surplus is divided. This 
section shows that the set of perfect equilibria (PE) depends on the information cost and may 
have the following properties. (i) If the information cost c is low, the buyer acquires 
information and only he captures some surplus. If c is in an intermediate range then three 
cases can arise. (ii) No PE with trade exists. (iii) No agent acquires information and both 
agents capture some surplus. (iv) No agent acquires information and the seller captures the 
full surplus. (v) If c is high then no agent acquires information and the buyer captures the full 
surplus. Whether there is a first or second mover advantage in take-it-or-leave-it offer 
bargaining depends on the information cost. The time index is omitted in this section. 
To get started, suppose that the information cost is high and the buyer does not 
acquire information and is willing to offer the seller the full surplus 2∆ by proposing the 
price b=E[v]+∆. The seller has two potential profitable responses. (i) The seller accepts this 
offer and chooses s=Y. He gets EUS=2∆ and the buyer obtains EUB=0. (ii) The seller 
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acquires information and chooses s=Y if he sees that v=vL; and s=N if he sees v=vH. An 
agreement is only reached at v=vL and in this case trade is executed at the price 
p=E[v]+∆= 21 (vH+vL)+∆. The seller’s payoff is  EUS= 21 [p−(vL−∆)]−c= 41 (vH−vL)+∆−c.  
The second strategy dominates the first one if 41 (vH−vL)+∆−c>2∆ which is the case 
for c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆. While 41 (vH−vL) is the expected speculative profit an informed seller 
makes, ∆ can be interpreted as the expected opportunity cost of speculation. If the seller 
speculates no trade occurs in the state vH and ex ante he forgoes with probability 0.5 the 
surplus 2∆. This argument shows that in such a case the seller wants to acquire information 
and exploit the uninformed buyer although he is offered the full surplus. Given response (ii), 
the payoff of the uninformed buyer is EUB= 21 [(vL+∆)−p]=− 41 (vH−vL). So if c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ 
the buyer does not propose an offer which reflects the average quality of the asset. He has to 
submit a defensive offer so as to account for the endogenous lemons problem.  
Proposition 1 shows that if the information cost c is higher than the maximum surplus 
an informed buyer can capture (in any mixed strategy trading equilibrium) the buyer does not 
acquire information. Secondly, If c is also higher than the trading surplus an uninformed  
buyer can capture when providing the seller an incentive to acquire information by just 
compensating him for c, the buyer does not do this either. The maximum price an 
uninformed buyer is willing to propose is his expected valuation E[v]+∆. The minimum 
price an uninformed seller is willing to accept is his expected valuation E[v]−∆. However, 
since c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ the buyer does not offer any price within this interval because of the 
endogenous lemons concern. He proposes a lower price which an uninformed seller does not 
accept. Therefore, no agreement arises although in the no trade equilibrium the buyer and 
seller maintain symmetric information.4  
 
                                                          
4 This no efficient trade result is neither driven by asymmetric information about the common valuation as in 
Akerlof (1970), Samuelson (1984), or Gresik (1991) nor by asymmetric information about the private valuation 
as in Myerson and Satterthwhaite (1983) but by potential lemons problems due to endogenous information 
acquisition. It is not only actual asymmetric information but potential information asymmetry can already 
render efficient trade unattractive. Dang (2005) shows that a no-trade result also holds (i) in double-auction 
bargaining and (ii) for the case where the state space is a continuous random variable and the agents can 
acquire n∈N units of information.  
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Proposition 1 
If 2k∆<c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ the set of PE is given as follows. The buyer chooses nB=0 and 
b<vL−∆+2c  and the seller chooses nS=0 and s=N. No PE with trade exists.  
 
For a formal statement of k where k∈( 21 ,1) see Step 3 in Appendix A. The argument above 
also shows that if the buyer offers E[v]+∆ and the information cost is larger than the 
expected speculative profit net the expected opportunity cost of speculation, i.e. 
c≥ 41 (vH−vL)−∆, then the seller accepts the offer without information acquisition and gets 
EUS=2∆. On the other hand if the buyer offers E[v]−∆ and  if c< 41 (vH−vL), the seller 
acquires information and speculates instead of just getting EUS=0. Therefore, if 
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1 (vH−vL)−∆<c< 41 (vH−vL), there exists a critical offer which the seller accepts without 
information acquisition. This offer must give the seller some trading surplus.  
 
Proposition 2 
If max{ 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆}<c< 41 (vH−vL) then in the unique PE the buyer 
chooses nB=0 and b=vH−∆−2c and the seller chooses nS=0 and s=Y. Trade occurs with 
probability 1 and EUB=2∆+2c− 21 (vH−vL) and EUS= 21 (vH−vL)−2c.  
 
Proposition 2 shows that the agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-offer captures some 
trading surplus. The possibility to acquire information endows the responder with a credible 
speculative threat in the sense of saying, that if he does no get enough trading surplus he 
acquires information and exploits the uninformed proposer. The next proposition shows that 
a perfect equilibrium exists in which  the responder captures the full trading surplus.  
 
Proposition 3 
If 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL)≤c= 41 (vH−vL)−∆ then in any PE the buyer gets EUB=0. There exists a 
PE in which the buyer chooses nB=0 and b= 21 (vH+vL)+∆ and the seller chooses nS=0 and 
s=Y. Trade occurs with probability 1 and EUS=2∆.  
 
If the information cost is higher than the speculative profit, then the buyer is not concerned 
about the endogenous lemons problem. In the unique perfect equilibrium no agent acquires 
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information, trade occurs with probability 1 and the buyer captures the full surplus. This 
corresponds to the standard take-it-or-leave-it-offer setting. 
 
Proposition 4 
If c≥ 41 (vH−vL), then in the unique PE the buyer chooses nB=0 and b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆ and the 
seller chooses nB=0 and s=Y. Trade occurs with probability 1 and EUB=2∆ and EUS=0. 
 
The last case which has not been addressed so far is the low information cost case. The next 
proposition shows that in a PE the buyer acquires information and a signaling game arises in 
which the seller also has the option to acquire information.5 For a formal statement of αc, βc, 
γ, k and t in Proposition 5 see Step 3 Appendix A which shows that α and β depends on the 
information cost c. 
 
Proposition 5 
If c<min{2k∆, 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL)} then a PE in mixed strategies has the following 
properties. The buyer chooses nB=1. If v=vL the buyer chooses bL=vL−∆+t. If v=vH the buyer 
chooses bH=vH−∆ with probability αc and bL=vL−∆+t with probability 1−αc. The seller 
chooses the following: If he sees b=vH−∆ he chooses=Y. If the seller sees b=vL−∆+t he 
chooses nS=1 with probability βc and nS=0 with probability 1−βc. If he is supposed to choose 
nS=1, then seeing v=vL the seller chooses s=Y. Otherwise he chooses s=N. If the seller is 
supposed to choose nS=0 then he chooses s=Y with probability γ and s=N with probability 
1−γ. Trade occurs with positive probability and EUB=2k∆−c and EUS=0.  
 
Remark 1 
This paper assumes that information acquisition is observable. If information acquisition is 
not observable no equilibrium in pure strategies exists for c< 41 (vH−vL). Yet all qualitative 
results may hold since a potential second mover advantage carries over to this case. 
 
 
                                                          
5 The observation that risk neutral agents may overinvest in information is related to Matthews (1984) and 
Hausch and Li (1993) who show that bidders acquire excessive information in pure common values auctions. 
Bergemann and Valimäki (2002) employs a mechanism design approach and a local efficiency concept. They 
show that any ex post efficient allocation mechanism causes an ex ante information acquisition inefficiency.  
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4.  Two-Period Bargaining 
The previous section shows that whether there is a first-mover or second-mover advantage in 
take-it-or-leave-it-offer bargaining depends on the information cost. This section extends the 
one-period case to two-period alternating offer bargaining and analyses the impact of the 
discounting of the trading surplus and the discounting of the information cost on the timing 
of information acquisition and trade as well as the terms-of-trade.  
To focus on the interesting case, section 4 is based on the assumption that the 
information cost is low. Proposition 5 shows that in the one-period setting in any PE the 
buyer acquires information and trade occurs with positive probability and EUB=2k∆−c and 
EUS=0. In order to keep the analysis tractable, two technical assumptions are made so that  a 
full characterization of the set of PE for any c1≤c0 and δ∈[0,1] can be given.  
 
Assumption T1 (Bargaining technology) 
The bargaining is conducted as follows. The agents submit their actions to a machine 
according to the following rules. The machine have entries called "bL(t)" and "bH(t)" for the 
buyer and "sL(t)" and "sH(t)" for the seller. (The machine sees nB(t) and nS(t).) 
(1) An informed proposer is allowed to submit two different offers to the machine. An 
uninformed proposer is not allowed to submit state-contingent offers and must submit one 
offer to the machine. Both entries are filled with one number. An informed responder is 
allowed to submit two different responses. An uninformed responder is only allowed to 
submit one response. Both entries are filled with the same acceptance or rejection decision. 
(2) The machine determines trade according to the following rule. Suppose the buyer is the 
proposer in period t. (a) Suppose vt=vtL. If sL(t)=Y then trade occurs at the price bL(t). If 
sL(t)=N there is no trade in period t. (b) If vt=vtH then sH(t) is relevant for the determination 
of trade. Analogously for the case where the seller is the proposer. 
 
Assumption T2 (Information) 
(1)  It is common knowledge that the quality of the asset vt is governed by a binomial 
process with step −k and +k and with equal probability where k>0, i.e. in period 0 v0 is either 
v0L=v−k or v0H=v+k; and in period 1 v1 is either v1L=v0−k or v1H=v0+k. (Note, vtH−vtL=2k.) 
(2) v is public information in period 0; and v0 is public information in period 1.  
(3) In period 0, if agent i chooses ni(0)=0, then he knows that E[v0]=v. In period 1, if he 
chooses ni(1)=0 then he knows that E[v1]=v0. If he chooses ni(1)=1, then he knows the true 
value v1. 
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(4) If ni(0)=1, then in period 0 agent i knows the true value v0 but not the realization v1, i.e 
E0[v1]=v0. In the beginning of period 1 he is then informed about the true value v1.  
 
Assumption T3 (Low information cost in period 0) 
c0<min{2∆, 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆}. 
 
Remark 2 
Assumption T1 eliminates any types of signaling. Assumption T2 eliminates a kind of 
“cheating”. (See Remark B2 in Appendix B.) Section 5 discusses the role of these 
assumptions and argues that they are not crucial for the results but simplifies the analysis 
significantly. 
 
Remark 3 
Assumption T1 implies that k=1 in the Propositions 1 to 5. The equilibrium strategies in the 
Propositions 1 to 4 hold without modification. In Proposition 5 the buyer chooses nB=1 and 
bL=vL−∆, bH≥vH−∆ if v=vL; and bL≥vL−∆, bH=vH−∆ if v=vH. The seller chooses nS=0 and 
s=Y. In any PE trade occurs with probability 1 and UB=2∆−c and US=0.  
 
Section 4.1 derives a waiting-to-invest argument in information acquisition for the delay of 
agreement. Section 4.2 shows that the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic 
in the discount factor of the trading surplus. Lemma 1 characterizes the continuation payoff 
of the seller if he does not acquire information and rejects any offer in period 0.  
 
Lemma 1 
Assumptions T1 to T3 hold. The default option D of the seller is given as follows. (i) For 
δ≤ ∆2c1 , D=0 if nB(0)=0 and D=δ∆ if nB(0)=1. (ii) For ∆2c1 ≤δ≤ ∆1c , D=2δ∆−c1 if nB(0)=0 and 
D=δ∆ if nB(0)=1. (iii) For δ≥ ∆1c , D=2δ∆−c1. 
 
4.1  The Delay of Agreement 
Lemma 1 shows that if the buyer acquires information he may increase the default option of 
the seller. The intuition is simple. Given the endogenous lemons problem, if both agents are 
uninformed no trade occurs at all. If one agent is informed trade occurs with positive 
probability. In this sense actual asymmetric information is “better” than potential asymmetric 
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information. Therefore, the information acquisition of the buyer exerts a positive externality 
on the seller since trade occurs with positive probability in period 1. So the default option of 
the seller is endogenous and depends on both the discounting and the information acquisition 
decision of the buyer. This section shows that if the discount factor of the trading surplus is 
high, no agent acquires information in period 0 and the delay of agreement occurs with 
probability 1.  
 
Proposition 6 
Assumptions T1 to T3 hold. If (i) δ>max{ ∆−− 2 cc 101 , ∆1c } or (ii) max{ ∆2c1 , ∆−− 10 cc1 , ∆− 0c2 } 
<δ< ∆1c  then the set of PE has the following properties. No agent acquires information and no 
trade occurs in period 0. In period 1 the seller acquires information, trade occurs with 
probability 1 and UB=0 and US=2δ∆−c1.  
 
Proposition 6 shows that no PE exists in which trade occurs in period 0 although the buyer 
and the seller maintain symmetric information. Therefore, the delay of agreement is not 
caused by signaling but by an endogenous lemons problem and an equilibrium timing 
consideration of information acquisition. Since c0< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ the endogenous lemons 
problem is severe so that no trade occurs in period 0 if no agent acquires information.  
The intuition behind Proposition 6 (i) is as follows. Lemma 1 shows that for δ> ∆1c  the 
continuation payoff of the seller is 2δ∆−c1. Therefore, the seller rejects any offer which gives 
him less than what he can get in period 1 and the buyer can obtain at most 2∆−(2δ∆−c1). If 
the remaining surplus which the buyer obtains does not cover the information cost c0, the 
buyer does not acquire information. The best responses in period 0 are such that no agent 
acquires information. Because of the endogenous lemons problem  the buyer submits a low 
offer which an uninformed seller does not accept. There is no asymmetric information and 
yet no trade occurs in period 0.  
 
Remark 4 
Rewriting the condition in Proposition 6 (i) shows that delay may occur if 2∆(1−δ)<(c0−c1), 
i.e.  if the drop in the total trading surplus is smaller than the drop in the cost of information 
acquisition (assuming that one agent acquires information at some time). Therefore, if 
information is acquired in equilibrium it is socially optimal to delay trade. This results is 
similar in flavor to Ingersoll and Ross (1992) who derive an optimal waiting time argument 
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to invest under uncertainty without strategic interactions. Proposition 6 (i) proposes a kind of 
waiting-to-agree-result or optimal timing argument to invest in information subject to an 
endogenous lemons constraint.  
 
Proposition 6 (ii) shows that although the discounting of trading surplus is not too high delay 
may also occur. Lemma 1 shows that for ∆2
c1 <δ< ∆1c , (a) the default option of the seller is  
D=2δ∆−c1 if nB(0)=0; and (b) D=δ∆>2δ∆−c1 if nB(0)=1. So if the buyer does not acquire 
information but provides the seller an incentive to acquire information the default option of 
the seller is lower but trade only occurs with probability 0.5 in period 0, because the buyer 
accounts for the lemons problem and EUB=∆−c0−(δ∆−c1). If the buyer acquires information 
the default option of the seller is higher but trade occurs with probability 1 in period 0 and 
UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. If both alternatives yield a negative payoff no agent acquires information. 
Because of the endogenous lemons problem the buyer proposes a low offer which an 
uninformed seller does not accept.  So no trade occurs in period 0. 
 
4.2 The Role of Discounting 
Proposition 6 shows that if δ is high, a waiting-to-agree result arises and UB=0 and 
US=2δ∆−c1. The next Proposition shows that if δ is low, an agreement in reached 
immediately. Given Assumption T1, Proposition 7(ai) contains Proposition 1 (δ=0) as a 
special case. 
 
Proposition 7 
Assumptions T1 to T3 hold. 
(a)  If (i) δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆− 0c2 , 21 }, (ii) max{ ∆2c1 , ∆−− 10 cc1 }<δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆− 0c2 }, or (iii) ∆2c1 <δ< 
min{ ∆1
c , ∆
−− 10 cc1 } and c1<∆, then in any PE the buyer acquires information and trade occurs 
in period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆ and US=δ∆.  
(b)  If ∆1
c <δ< ∆−− 2 cc 101  then in any PE the buyer acquires information and trade occurs in 
period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−2δ∆+c1 and US=2δ∆−c1. 
 
For other parameter constellations of c0, c1, and δ, endogenous outside option and 
endogenous lemons problem give rise to further types of equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 
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8 and 9 show that disagreement occurs with positive probability in period 0. Proposition 10 
shows that no PE exists in which an agreement is reached in any of the two periods. 
 
Proposition 8 
Assumptions T1 to T3 hold. If max{ 10c −∆ , 21 }<δ< ∆2c1 , then set of PE has the following 
properties. The seller acquires information in period 0. If  v0=v0L trade occurs. If v0=v0H, 
there is disagreement. In period 1 trade occurs with probability 1 and  EUB=∆+δ∆−c0 and 
EUS=0. 
 
Proposition 8 contains two observations. (1) The buyer does not acquire information but 
provides the seller an incentive to acquire information in period 0. The reason is the positive 
externality of information acquisition. Lemma 1 shows that for δ< ∆2c1  the continuation 
payoff of the seller is zero, if the buyer does not acquire information in period 0. If the buyer 
acquires information he increases the seller’s continuation payoff to δ∆. In period 0 the 
buyer faces a trade-off when comparing the two alternatives. (i) If the buyer does not acquire 
information but provides the seller an incentive to do so, the buyer is able to keep the default 
option of the seller at zero but trade only occurs with probability 0.5 in period 0. His payoff 
is EUB=∆+δ∆−c0. (ii) If the buyer acquires information the default option of the seller 
increases to δ∆ but trade occurs with probability 1. His payoff is UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. Proposition 
8 gives conditions such that alternative (i) dominates (ii) and alternative (i) yields EUB>0. 
(2) The equilibrium payoff of the buyer increases in the discount factor δ of trading 
surplus. The intuition is as follows. In period 0 the buyer does not acquire information but 
provides the seller an incentive to do so. The buyer accounts for the lemons problem and 
trade only occurs in the low state. If there is no trade in period 0 in period 1 the seller is 
informed and trade occurs with probability 1 and the seller gets 2δ∆.6 In period 0 the buyer 
can capture this additional surplus by proposing an appropriate offer and his expected payoff 
increases in δ. The seller may accept this offer since his continuation payoff is anyway zero. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 If the Assumptions T1 and T2 are not employed, yet trade occurs in a mixed strategies equilibrium with 
positive probability in period 1 so that in period 0 the buyer can capture the period 1 surplus. See also the 
discussion in section 5.2.   
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Remark 5 
Proposition 8 may also hold for c1=c0. Proposition 9 and 10 complete the description of the 
set of PE for c0<min{2∆, 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆} and any c1≤c0 and δ∈[0,1]. 
 
Proposition 9 
Assumptions T1 to T3 hold. If max ∆2
c1 <δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆−− 10 cc1 } and c1>∆ then the set of PE has 
the following properties. The seller acquires information in period 0. If  v0=v0L trade occurs. 
If v0=v0H, there is disagreement. In period 1 trade occurs with probability 1 and EUB=∆−c0−
δ∆+c1 and EUS=2δ∆−c1.  
 
Proposition 10 
Assumption T1 to T3 hold. If (i) 2− ∆0c <δ<min{ 21 , ∆2c1 } or (ii) 21 <δ<min{ ∆0c −1, ∆2c1 } then no 
PE with trade exists.  
 
Proposition 10 can be interpreted as saying that there exists parameter constellations such 
that neither the first period nor the second period proposer is able to capture enough surplus 
so that nobody acquires costly information. Because of the endogenous lemons problem no 
trade occurs at all.  
 
 
5.  Discussion 
Section 5.1 provides some numerical examples. The driving force behind the results is that 
information acquisition in a common values environment exerts two effects. It can cause an 
endogenous lemons problem and implies that the default option D of the seller is 
endogenous. Section 5.2 argues that the Assumptions T1 and T2 are not crucial because  
dropping these assumptions only changes the exact value of D but not the qualitative 
implications of Proposition 6 and 8. Section 5.3 shows that the delay result may hold for T-
period bargaining as well as for the case where the time interval between offers converges to 
zero. 
 
5.1  Numerical Examples 
Section 3 shows that the equilibrium payoff of the agents are non-monotonic in the 
information cost in take-it-or-leave-it-offer bargaining. If Assumption T1 is employed then  
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k=1. Two numerical examples are illustrated in Figure 2. Graph (a) plots the equilibrium 
payoffs of the agents as a function of the information cost for the parameter values ∆= 201  and 
vH−vL=1 and shows that the Propositions 5, 1, 3, and 4 arise consecutively. In Graph (b) 
where ∆= 81  and vH−vL=1, the Propositions 5, 3  and 4 arise consecutively.  
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Figure 2. The equilibrium payoff of the buyer (proposer) and the seller (responder) in take-it-or-leave-it-offer 
bargaining is plotted as a function of the information cost for the parameter values in (a) 2∆=1/10, vH−vL=1 
and (b) 2∆=1/4, vH−vL=1. 
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Figure 3. The equilibrium payoff of the buyer (first-period proposer) and the seller (second-period proposer) 
in two-period alternating-offer bargaining is plotted as a function of the discount factor of trading surplus for 
the parameter values in (a) c0=5.6, c1=5, 2∆=8, and vH−vL=60 and (b) c0=6.6, c1=5, 2∆=8, and vH−vL=60. 
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Section 4 derives a waiting-to-agree result and shows that the equilibrium payoffs are non-
monotonic in the discounting of trading surplus in two period alternating offer bargaining. In 
Graph 3 (a) the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are plotted as a function of the discount 
factor for the parameter values c0=5.6, c1=5, ∆=4 and vH−vL=60 and shows that the 
Propositions 7, 8, 9 and 6(ii) arise consecutively. In Graph 3 (b) where c0=6.6, c1=5, ∆=4 and 
vH−vL=60, the Propositions 7, 10 (i,ii) and 6 (ii) arise consecutively. 
 
5.2  The Role of The Technical Assumptions 
Suppose that the Assumptions T1 and T2 are no employed for the two-period case. If the 
buyer acquires information, a signaling game with endogenous information acquisition 
arises. Assumption T1 is made to circumvent signaling in the one-period case or within the 
same period. Assumption T2 is made to eliminate “cheating” and signaling in the two-period 
case (see Remark B2 in Appendix B). These assumptions are not crucial for the waiting-to-
agree result in Proposition 6 as the following argument shows. If 2∆0<c0< 41 (vH−vL)−∆0, then 
in no equilibrium does any agent acquire information in period 0. Because of the endogenous 
lemons problem the uninformed  proposer submits a defensive offer which the uninformed 
responder rejects. So no trade arises in the standard setting, too.  
These assumptions are also not crucial for Proposition 8 which states that the 
equilibrium payoff of the buyer (first-period proposer) increases in δ. The argument is 
similar. Suppose the information cost in period 1 is such that 2δ∆<c1< 41 (vH−vL)−δ∆. In 
period 0 the buyer has two options. (i) If the buyer does not acquire information the default 
option of the seller is 0. Suppose the uninformed buyer provides the seller an incentive to 
acquire information the buyer accounts for the endogenous lemons problem and no trade 
occurs in the high state in period 0. In period 1 the agents face a signaling game since the 
seller is informed. Denote M1=2k1δ∆ (where 0.5<k1<1) as the maximum surplus the seller 
(proposer) can capture in period 1 in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In period 0 the buyer 
can propose an offer which extracts M1. (ii) If the buyer acquires information, the default 
option of the seller is 2k2δ∆ (where 0<k2<1) but trade may occurs with probability p0>0.5 in 
a mixed strategy equilibrium in period 0. So the buyer compares the payoff (i) 
EUB=∆−c0+2k1δ∆ with (ii) EUB=p0⋅2∆−c0−k2δ∆. If δ>(2p0−1)/2(k1+k2), the buyer chooses 
the first alternative so that his expected payoff increases in δ even in the standard setting. 
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5.3  The Length of Bargaining 
A potential difficulty in analyzing a T-period or an infinite horizon version (with or without 
the Assumptions T1 and T2) is that the continuation payoffs of the agents depend on the 
information acquisition as well as the processes {∆t}and {ct} in a complex fashion. This 
section discusses some special cases and shows that the delay or waiting-to-agree-result 
holds for T-period and infinite horizon bargaining as well as for the case where the time 
interval between offers converges to zero. This section also shows that the analysis of 
information acquisition in infinite horizon bargaining reduces to a finite consideration if the 
discounting of the trading surplus is larger than the discounting of the information cost. 
(a) Suppose that t∈[0,1] is real time, and each bargaining round has a length of γ. If 
there is T bargaining rounds within the time interval 0 and 1, each bargaining round is of 
length γ=1/T. Furthermore, suppose that ∆t=δγ⋅t∆ for t∈{0, T1 , T2 ,..,1} and  ct=βγ⋅tc for 
t∈{0, T1 , T2 ,.., T1T− } and c1=ε where 2∆<c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆, β≥δ, and ε small. It is straightforward 
to show that in no perfect Bayesian equilibrium does any agent acquire information at time 
t<1 or in any of the bargaining rounds 0 to T−1 because ct>2∆t. Since ct< 41 (vH−vL)−∆t, the 
uninformed proposer submits a defensive offer which the uninformed responder does not 
accept. So no trade occurs at time t<1. If T?∞, then the time interval between offers 
converges to zero. This argument shows that the specification of the length of single 
bargaining rounds is not crucial for the delay of agreement in this model. At time t=1 or in 
the final bargaining round T, information is acquired by at least one agent and trade occurs 
with positive probability. 
(b) Suppose that T is infinite, ∆t=δt∆, ct=βtc, and c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ (for t=0,1,2,..). (i) If 
2∆<c and δ≤β then the agents never reach an agreement. (ii) If 2∆>c and δ<β then the 
analysis of information acquisition in infinite horizon bargaining reduces to a finite 
consideration. There exists a t* such that  2∆t<ct  for t>t*. If no agent acquires information in 
any period t<t*, no agreement will be reached anymore. So one can start with the backward 
induction argument in period t* to determine information acquisition. However, once 
information is acquired, the game switches back to the infinite horizon version. Therefore, 
further research on this case might be of interest.  
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6.  Conclusion 
This paper analyses information acquisition in two period alternating offer bargaining where  
a buyer and a seller seek to agree on a price at which to trade an asset with a significant 
common value component (such as a financial asset).7 This paper shows that information 
acquisition in such an environment can cause an endogenous lemons problem and  implies 
that the outside options of the agents are endogenous. These two consequences give rise to a 
rich set of strategic considerations so that perfect equilibria may have the following 
properties. (1) In the one period game the agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-it-offer 
captures the full trading surplus. Whether there is a first or second mover advantage in 
ultimatum bargaining depends on the information cost. (2) If the discounting of the trading 
surplus is lower than the discounting of the information cost, the delay of agreement arises 
although in the period of disagreement the agents may maintain symmetric information. (3) 
The equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the discount factor of the trading 
surplus.  
 
 
Appendix A 
This Appendix proves Propositions 1 to 5 together. The proof proceeds as follows. Step 1 
analyses the best response correspondence of the seller to nB=0 and b. Step 2 analyzes the 
buyer’s payoff expectations at different triples nB=0 and b, ensuring best responses of the 
seller. Step 3 analyses the best response correspondences for the case where nB=1. Step 4 
characterizes the decision of the buyer and step 5 summarizes the PE paths.  
 
Step 1   
This step analyzes the best response correspondence of the seller to nB=0 and b. If the seller 
does not acquire information his strategy is denoted with (nS,s)=(0,s). If the seller acquires 
                                                          
7 The article "Uncertainty prompts BT to delay bond issues" by R. Bream and A. van Duyne in the Financial 
Times 23 August 2000 edition reported that British Telecommunications (BT) would delay the launch of its 
Dollars 10bn bond deal because of uncertainty about its rating on both sides of the market. A manager of BT is 
quoted with "We have deferred the bond issue because we are awaiting clarification from the rating agencies." 
The authors write that "Both S&P and Moody's Investors Service have BT's ratings on review for a likely 
downgrade, and investors are trying to determine how low its rating would go. BT hopes that by delaying its 
deal investors will know the full extend of any agency move before deciding whether to buy bonds, therefore 
securing more accurate pricing." Instead of writing a complete contract which specifies the interest rate as 
function of the rating decision, BT decided for the delay of the take-it-or-leave-it-offer of the bond issue. 
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information his strategy is denoted with (nS,sL,sH)=(1,sL,sH) where sL and sH denote his 
responses when seeing v=vL and v=vH, respectively. 
  
Step 1a 
Case 1: If b≤vL−∆, then the seller never wants to sell, so he has nothing to gain from 
buying information. The best response to (0,b) with b≤vL−∆ is given by (0,s) where s=N. 
Case 2: Suppose vL−∆<b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆. (a) If the seller acquires no information, he 
can only loose from trading, so (0,s) with s=Y is a dominated choice. His maximal payoff 
without information acquisition is therefore EUS=0. (b) If the seller buys information, then  
he will choose sH=N if v=vH; and sL=Y if v=vL. His maximal expected payoff with 
information acquisition is EUS= 21 [b−(vL−∆)]−c.  
Consequently, if 21 (b−vL+∆)−c<0, the best response of the seller to (0,b) where vL−
∆<b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆ is given by (0,s) with s=N. If 21 (b−vL+∆)−c>0, the best response of the 
seller to (0,b) where vL−∆<b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆ is given by (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. If 
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1 (b−vL+∆)−c=0, the set of best responses of the seller is given by (0,s) with s=N and 
(1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. 
Case 3: Suppose b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆. The same argument shows that if 21 (b−vL+∆)−c<0 
the set of best response of the seller is given by (0,s) with s=N and (0,s) with s=Y. If 21 (b−
vL+∆)−c>0, then as before, the best response of the seller is given by (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and 
sH=N. If  21 (b−vL+∆)−c=0, then the set of best responses of the seller is given by  (0,s) with 
s=Y,  (0,s) with s=N, and (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. 
Case 4: Suppose 21 (vH+vL)−∆<b<vH−∆. (a) If the seller acquires no information, he 
chooses s=Y. His expected payoff is EUS=b− 21 (vH+vL)+∆. (b) If the seller buys information, 
then he chooses sL=Y and sH=N. His maximal expected payoff with information acquisition 
is EUS= 21 [b−(vL−∆)]−c, as before.  
It follows that if 21 (b−vL+∆)−c<b− 21 (vH+vL)+∆, the best response of the seller to 
(0,b,b) with 21 (vH+vL)−∆<b<vH−∆ is given by (0,s) with s=Y. If 21 (b−vL+∆)−c>b−
2
1 (vH+vL)+∆, the best response of the seller to (0,b) with  21 (vH+vL)−∆<b<vH−∆ is given by 
(1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. Otherwise the seller is indifferent between the two responses. 
 Case 5: Suppose b=vH−∆. (a) If the seller does buy information, he chooses sL=Y and 
he is willing to set sH=Y, allowing a trade to occur albeit without any net gain to himself. His 
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expected payoff is EUS= 21 (b−vL+∆)+ 21 (b−vH+∆)−c= b− 21 (vL+vH)+∆−c. (b) If the seller does 
not acquire information, then he chooses s=Y and EUS=b− 21 (vL+vH)+∆. Consequently, 
buying information is dominated by not buying information. The seller’s best response to 
(0,b) with b=vH−∆ is to choose (0,s) with s=Y.  
 Case 6: Suppose b>vH−∆. The same argument as in case 5 shows that the seller’s best 
response to (0,b) with b>vH−∆ is to choose (0,s) with s=Y. 
 
Step 1b 
The preceding discussion has not yet gone into much detail about the seller’s information 
acquisition decision. In case 1, 5, and 6 the information acquisition best response of the 
seller is not to acquire information. Only if vL−∆<b<vH−∆, it is potentially worthwhile for 
the seller to acquire information. In case 2 and 3, the information acquisition decision turns 
on whether  
 
(1) 21 (b−vL+∆)−c <=> 0, 
 
in case 4 on whether  
 
(2) 21 (b−vL+∆)−c <=> b− 21 (vH+vL)+∆. 
 
Given that the left-hand side of (1) is increasing in b and the difference between the left-hand 
side and the right-hand side of (2) is decreasing in b, information acquisition is attractive at 
any price b if and only if it is attractive at b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, the upper bound of the interval 
defining Cases 2 and 3 and the lower bound of the interval defining Case 4. Substituting 
b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆ into the left-hand side of (2) yield (vH−vL)/4−c. Thus there are three 
possibilities. 
 
Alternative I:  c> 41 (vH−vL). 
In this case, at b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, information acquisition is not worthwhile, i.e. 
 21 [ 21 (vH+vL)−∆−vL+∆]−c= 41 (vH−vL)−c < 0  
and 
 41 (vH+vL)−c < 21 (vH+vL)−∆− 21 (vH+vL)+∆.   
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So if c> 41 (vH−vL), then information acquisition is not worthwhile to the seller regardless of 
what price he expects the uninformed buyer to set. The seller’s best response to (0,b) is to 
choose (0,s) where (i) s=N if b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆, (ii) s=Y or s=N if b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, and  (iii) 
s=Y if b> 21 (vH+vL)−∆. 
 
Alternative II:  c< 41 (vH−vL). 
In this case, at b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, information acquisition is worthwhile, i.e. 
 21 [ 21 (vH+vL)−∆−vL+∆]−c= 41 (vH−vL)−c > 0  
and 
 41 (vH+vL)−c > 21 (vH+vL)−∆− 21 (vH+vL)+∆.   
 
Denote b  as the price where the left-hand side of (1) is just zero and b  where the left-hand 
side equals the right-hand side of (2). There exist critical prices  
 b =vL−∆+2c  < 21 (vH+vL)−∆,    
and  
 b =vH−∆−2c  > 21 (vH+vL)−∆,     
such that information acquisition is not worthwhile to the seller if the buyer sets b< b  or 
b> b . If the buyer sets b∈( b , b ), then it is worthwhile to the seller to acquire information. 
(At b  and b , the seller is indifferent.)  
 (i) The seller’s best response to (0,b) with b< b  or b> b  is to choose (0,s) where s=N 
if b< b  and s=Y if b> b . (ii) The seller’s best response to (0,b) with b∈( b , b ), is to choose 
(1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. (iii) For b= b , the seller is indifferent between (0,s) with s=N 
and (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. (iv) For b= b , the seller is indifferent between (0,s) with 
s=N and (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. 
 
Alternative III: c= 41 (vH−vL). 
This is the boundary between Alternatives I and II. For b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, the seller is 
indifferent between (0,s) with s=Y, (0,s) with s=Y, and (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. For 
 22
b≠ 21 (vH+vL)−∆, the best response of the seller is to choose (0,s) where s=N if b< 21 (vH+vL)−
∆, and s=Y if b> 21 (vH+vL)−∆. 
 
Step 2  
This step analyses the buyer’s payoff  expectations at triples (0,b) ensuring best responses of 
the seller. 
 
Alternative I: c> 41 (vH−vL). 
As mentioned, the seller’s best response correspondence to (0,b) is to choose (0,s) 
where (i) s=N if b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆, (ii) s=Y or s=N if b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, and  (iii) s=Y if 
b> 21 (vH+vL)−∆. The buyers’ payoff is zero if b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆ or if b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆ and s=N. 
The buyer’s payoff is EUB= 21 (vL+vH)+∆−b if b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆ and s=Y or b> 21 (vH+vL)−∆. 
 Thus, by setting b= 21 (vL+vH), the buyer can ensure himself the payoff ∆. All (0,b) 
with b< 21 (vH+vL)−∆ provides the buyer with a lower payoff than (0,b) with b= 21 (vH+vL)). 
Similarly, all triples (0,b) with b> 21 (vH+vL)−∆ provides the buyer with a worse payoff than 
the triple (0,b’) where 21 (vH+vL)−∆<b’<b. 
The only strategy without information acquisition of the buyer which is a candidate 
for being best response to a subform perfect strategy of the seller is thus given by the triple 
(0,b) with b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆. However, if this is to be best response of the buyer, it must be the 
case, that the seller’s response to this choice is to set  (0,s) with s=Y, i.e. the seller must 
resolve his indifference by opting for trade. In this case EUB=2∆. 
 
Remark A1 
This line of arguments will be used repeatedly to establish (the existence of) best responses 
of the agents. Otherwise the proposer has no best responses. (See Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1998, p.116).) The subsequent steps assume that an indifferent responder chooses a 
response from his set of best responses which the proposer prefers most. 
 
Alternative II: c< 41 (vH−vL). 
Case 1 and 2a: (i) If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b< b =vL−∆+2c, the seller chooses 
(0,s) with s=N. (ii) If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b= b , the seller is indifferent between (0,s) 
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and s=N and (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. Depending on which alternative the seller 
chooses, the buyer’s payoff is EUB=0 or EUB= 21 (vL+∆− b )=∆−c. 
Case 2b, 3, 4a: (i) If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b =vL−∆+2c<b< b =vH−∆−2c , the 
seller chooses (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N and EUB= 21 (vL+∆−b). (ii) If the buyer chooses 
(0,b) with b= b  , the seller is indifferent between choosing (0,s) with s=Y and (1,sL,sH) with 
sL=Y and sH=N. If the seller chooses the first alternative, then  EUB= 21 (vL+vH)+∆− b = 
2
1 (vL+vH)+∆− (vH−∆−2c)=2∆+2c− 21 (vH−vL). If the seller chooses the second alternative, 
then EUB= 21 (vL+∆− b )=∆+c− 21 (vH−vL) < 2∆+2c − 21 (vH−vL). So the buyer has a strict 
preference to have the seller resolve his indifference by not acquiring information. 
 Case 4b, 5, 6: If the buyer chooses (0,b) with b> b =vH−∆−2c , the seller chooses (0,s) 
where s=Y and EUB= 21 (vL+vH)+∆−b < 2∆+2c− 21 (vH−vL). 
 
Given these observations, any choice (0,b) with b> b  is obviously worse for the buyer than 
the choice (0,b) with b= 21 (b+ b ). Similarly, any choice (0,b) with b <b< b  is worse for the 
buyer than (0,b) with b= 21 (b+ b ); as is the choice (0,b) with b= b  followed by information 
acquisition of the seller, i.e. (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N.  
The only strategies without information acquisition of the buyer which remain as 
possible candidates for being best responses to a subform perfect strategy of the seller are the 
following: (i) (0,b) with b= b , assuming that this is followed by the seller choosing (0,s) with 
s=Y, (ii) (0,b) with b= b , assuming that this is followed by (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N, 
(iii) (0,b) with b< b , followed by (0,s) where s=N.  Path (i) implies EUB=2∆+2c− 21 (vH−vL), 
path (ii) implies EUB=∆−c, and path (iii) implies no trade and EUB=0.  
 
Alternative III: c= 41 (vH−vL). 
Based on an analogous argument as above, the only strategy without information 
acquisition of the buyer which is a candidate for being best response to a subform perfect 
strategy of the seller is given by (0,b) with b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, assuming that the indifferent 
seller chooses (0,s) with s=Y. Then EUB=2∆ and EUS=0.  
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Step 3 
This step analyses the case where nB=1.  
(a) The following argument shows that no best responses in pure strategies exist. Suppose 
the informed buyer is honest and chooses b=vL−∆ if v=vL and b=vH−∆ if v=vH. In this case 
the seller is willing to choose s=Y. However, if the seller always chooses s=Y, the buyer has 
an incentive to choose b=vL−∆. (If the seller always choose s=N when seeing b<vH−∆ then 
the buyer always chooses b=vH−∆ if v=vH. In this case seeing b=vL−∆ is fully revealing and 
the seller may choose s=Y). So no best responses in pure strategies exists. 
(b) It is easy to see that choosing s=Y when seeing b=vL−∆ is a weakly dominated strategy. 
The seller never gets some surplus but may suffer a lemons problem. 
(c) Define bL=vL−∆+t for 0<t≤2∆ and bH=vH−∆. (Note, the informed buyer would not choose 
b>vL+∆ at v=vL. So any b>vL+∆ reveals that v≠vL.) 
(d) Best responses of both agents are obtained by construction. 
 
Step 3a 
(1) Suppose the buyer considers the following strategies. If the buyer sees v=vH then he 
chooses b=bH with probability α and b=bL with probability 1−α. If he sees v=vL then he 
chooses b=bL. 
(2)  Suppose the seller considers the following strategies. If the seller sees b=bH he chooses 
s=Y. If he sees b=bL two cases arises. (a) If t≥2c he may choose nS=1 with probability β, and 
nS=0 with probability 1−β. If he is supposed to choose nS=1 then seeing v=vL he chooses 
s=Y; and seeing v=vH he chooses s=N. If he is supposed to choose nS=0 then he chooses s=Y 
with probability γ and s=N with probability 1−γ. (b) If t<2c, he chooses nS=0 and s=Y with 
probability γ and s=N with probability 1−γ. 
 
Step 3b (Making the buyer indifferent at v=vH) 
(1)  Suppose the seller chooses nS=0. If v=vH and if the buyer chooses b=bH then his payoff 
is UB=2∆. The buyer is indifferent between choosing b=bL and b=bH at v=vH if 
EUB=γ[vH+∆−(vL−∆+t)]=2∆. (Note, c is sunk at the offer stage.) In order to make the buyer 
indifferent the seller chooses γ=2∆/(vH−vL+2∆−t).  
(2) Suppose the seller chooses nS=1 with probability β and nS=0 with probability 1−β. The 
buyer is indifferent between choosing b=bL and b=bH at v=vH if 
EUB=β[vL+∆−(vL−∆+t)]+(1−β)[γ(vH+∆−(vL−∆+t))]=2∆ ⇔ β[2∆−t]−β[γ(vH−vL+2∆−t)]=2∆ 
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−γ(vH−vL+2∆−t). In order to make the buyer indifferent the seller chooses 
β=(2∆−γ(vH−vL+2∆−t))/(2∆−t−γ(vH−vL+2∆−t)).  
 
Step 3c (Making the seller indifferent when seeing b=bL) 
Case 1: t<2c. 
The seller never chooses nS=1; see Case 2. If the uninformed seller sees b=bL and if 
he chooses s=Y then EUS= 21 [(vL−∆+t−(vL−∆)]+ 21 α0[(vL−∆+t−(vH−∆)]= 21 t+ 21 α0(vL−vH+t). 
If the seller chooses s=N then US=0. In order to make the seller indifferent the buyer chooses 
α0=t/(vH−vL−t).  
Case 2: t≥2c. 
The seller may choose nS=1. If the seller chooses nS=1 and sees v=vL then he chooses 
s=Y. Otherwise he chooses s=N. EUS= 21 [vL−∆+t−(vL−∆)]−c= 21 t−c. If the seller chooses 
nS=0 then EUS= 21 t+ 21 α1(vL−vH+t). The seller is indifferent between nS=0 and nS=1 if 
2
1 t−c= 21 t+ 21 α1(vL−vH+t). In order to make the seller indifferent the buyer chooses 
α1=c/(vH−vL−t). 
 
Step 3d (The decision of an informed buyer) 
Case 1: t<2c. 
The expected payoff of the buyer (before information acquisition) is  
EUB= 21 γ[(vL+∆−(vL−∆+t)]+ 21 [(1−α0)(vH+∆−(vH−∆))+α0γ(vH+∆−(vL−∆+t))]−c. 
EUB= 21 γ[2∆−t]+ 21 [(1−α0)2∆+α0γ(vH−vL+2∆−t)]−c. 
EUB= 21 γ[2∆−t]+∆−α 0∆+ 21 α0γ(vH−vL+2∆−t)−c. 
EUB=∆+∆(2∆−t)/(vH−vL+2∆−t)−c. 
The buyer chooses t∈(0,2∆) to maximizes his payoff and therefore,  
∆)vv(∆∆)²vv(∆)vv(t LHLH41LH21
*
0 −+−⋅−−+−+−+−= >0 . 
Define k0 such that 2k0∆=∆+∆(2∆−t)/(vH−vL+2∆−t) then  
 )t2∆v)/(v0.5t(∆k *0LH
*
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Case 1: t≥2c. 
The expected payoff of the buyer (before information acquisition) is  
EUB= 21 [(β+(1−β)γ[(vL+∆−(vL−∆+t)]+ 21 [(1−α)(vH+∆−(vH−∆))+α(1−β)γ(vH+∆−(vL−∆+t))]−c 
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Consequently, there exists a critical c’ such that if c>c’ the buyer chooses *0t  and α0. 
If c<c’ then the buyer chooses *1t  and α1. If c=c’ then the buyer is indifferent between the 
two alternatives. The payoff of the buyer is EUB=2k∆−c where k∈( 21 ,1) and k=max[k0, k1]. 
 
Step 4 (The buyer's decision) 
Alternative I: c> 41 (vH−vL).  
It is easy to see that the best response of the buyer is to choose (0,b) with 
b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, assuming that this is followed by (0,s) with s=Y. Trade occurs with 
probability 1 and EUB=2∆ and EUS=0. 
 
Alternative II: c= 41 (vH−vL).  
As above, the best response of the buyer is to choose (0,b) with b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆, 
assuming that this is followed by (0,s) with s=Y and EUB=2∆ and EUS=0. 
 
Alternative III: c< 41 (vH−vL). 
The set of candidates without information acquisition for being best responses is the 
following: (a) (0,b) with b=vH−∆−2c assuming it is followed by (0,s) with s=Y. (b) (0,b) 
with b=vL−∆+2c assuming it is followed by (1,sL,sH) with sL=Y and sH=N. (c) (0,b) where 
b<vL−∆+2c, followed by (0,s) with s=N. A candidate with information acquisition for being 
best responses is the following (d) (1,bL,bH) where the buyer randomizes over bL=vL−∆+t 
and  bH=vH−∆, assuming it is followed by (0,s) where the seller randomizes over s=Y and 
s=N. The buyer’s expected payoff of the various strategies are given as follows: (a) 2∆+2c−
2
1 (vH−vL), (b) ∆−c, (c) 0, and (d) 2k∆−c. (Since k> 21 , strategy (d) dominates strategy (b)).  
Case 1: c> 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL). 
Strategy (a) dominates strategy (d). So the buyer compares strategy (a) with (c). If  c< 41 (vH−
vL)−∆, the buyer chooses strategy (c). If c> 41 (vH−vL)−∆, the buyer chooses strategy (a). If  
c= 41 (vH−vL)−∆, the buyer is indifferent between the two choices. 
  Case 2:  c< 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL). 
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Strategy (d) dominates (a). The buyer compares strategy (d) with (c). If c>2k∆ the buyer the 
buyer chooses strategy (a). If c<2k∆ , the buyer chooses (d). If c=2k∆ the buyer the buyer is 
indifferent between the two strategies. 
Case 3:  c= 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL). 
The buyer is indifferent between strategy (a) and (d). So the buyer compares (a,d) with (c). If 
c>2k∆ the buyer chooses (c). If c<2k∆ , the buyer is indifferent between the alternatives (a) 
and (d). If c=2k∆ the buyer the buyer is indifferent between the three strategies. 
 
Step 5 (Equilibrium paths) 
If c<min{2k∆, 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL)} then a PE in mixed strategies has the following 
properties. The buyer chooses nB=1. If v=vL the buyer chooses bL=vL−∆+t. If v=vH the buyer 
chooses bH=vH−∆ with probability αc and bL=vL−∆+t with probability 1−αc. The seller 
chooses the following: If he sees b=vH−∆ he chooses=Y. If the seller sees b=vL−∆+t he 
chooses nS=1 with probability βc and nS=0 with probability 1−βc. If he is supposed to choose 
nS=1, then seeing v=vL the seller chooses s=Y. Otherwise he chooses s=N. If the seller is 
supposed to choose nS=0 then he chooses s=Y with probability γ and s=N with probability 
1−γ. Trade occurs with positive probability and EUB=2k∆−c and EUS=0. (Proposition 5)  
If 2k∆<c< 41 (vH−vL)−∆ then the set of SPE is given as follows. The buyer chooses 
(0,b) with b<vL−∆+2c  and the seller chooses (0,s) with s=N. There is no SPE with trade. 
(Proposition 1) 
If max{ 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆}<c< 41 (vH−vL) then in the unique PE the 
buyer chooses (0,b) with b=vH−∆−2c and the seller chooses (0,s) with s=Y. Trade occurs 
with probability 1 and EUB=2∆+2c− 21 (vH−vL) and EUS= 21 (vH−vL)−2c.  (The buyer chooses 
this strategy if 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL)<c<min{2k∆, 41 (vH−vL)} or max{2k∆, 41 (vH−vL)−
∆}<c< 41 (vH−vL).) (Proposition 2)  
If 32 ∆(k−1)+ 61 (vH−vL)≤c= 41 (vH−vL)−∆, then two types of PE exist. (i) The buyer 
chooses  (0,b) with b<vL−∆+2c  and the seller chooses (0,s) with s=N. No trade occurs. (ii) 
The buyer chooses (0,b) with b=vH−∆−2c= 21 (vH+vL)+∆ and the seller chooses (0,s) with 
s=Y. Trade occurs with probability 1 and EUB=0 and EUS= 21 (vH−vL)−2c=2∆. (Proposition 
3)  
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If c≥ 41 (vH−vL), then in the unique PE the buyer chooses (0,b) with b= 21 (vH+vL)−∆ 
and the seller chooses (0,s) with s=Y. Trade occurs with probability 1 and EUB=2∆ and 
EUS=0. (Proposition 4) QED 
 
 
Appendix B 
Remark B 1 
(a)  Given Assumption T1, the following arguments show that for Proposition 1 to 5 k=1. 
Define Lbˆ ≡vL−∆ and Hbˆ ≡vH−∆. It is easy to see that the best responses of the seller are 
given as follows. (i) If bL= Lbˆ  and bH= Hbˆ  then the seller is indifferent between s=Y and s=N. 
(ii) If bL= Lbˆ  and bH> Hbˆ  or bL> Lbˆ  and bH= Hbˆ  or bL> Lbˆ  and bH> Hbˆ   then the seller’s 
(weakly) best response is to choose s=Y. (iii) If bL< Lbˆ  and bH≥ Hbˆ  or bL≥ Lbˆ  and bH< Hbˆ  
then the seller chooses s=N. In any cases EUS≥0. 
(b)  It is easy to see that a best response of the informed buyer is to choose bL=vL−∆ and 
bH=vH−∆, assuming the indifferent seller opts for trade. The buyer gets UB=2∆−c and UB=0. 
However, the set of best responses is larger. If v=vL, the buyer can choose bL=vL−∆ and any 
bH≥vH−∆. If v=vH, the buyer can choose any bL≥vL−∆ and bH=vH−∆.  
 
The remainder of Appendix B is organized as follows. Lemma 1 is proven first which 
describes best responses in period 1 for the cases (i) nS(0)=0 and nB(0)=0 and (ii) nS(0)=0 
and nB(0)=1. Then the Propositions 6 to 10 are proven together. It is assumed that 
c0<min{2∆, 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆}. Since vtH−vtL=vH−vL for all t, the time subscript is 
dropped for this expression. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1  (Best responses in period 1) 
Case 1 : nS(0)=nB(0)=0. 
The situation is analogous to the one-period case. In period 1 the seller is the proposer and 
the buyer is the responder. (Note, c1≤c0 and ∆1=δ∆≤∆0.) 
If δ> ∆2c1  then c1<min{2∆1, 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆1}. Analogous to Proposition 1, a 
pair of best responses in this subgame is given as follows. The seller chooses nS(1)=1, 
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sL(1)=v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)=v1H+δ∆ and the indifferent buyer chooses nB(1)=0, b(1)=Y.  Trade 
occurs with probability 1. The continuation payoff of the seller is US=2δ∆−c1.  
If δ< ∆2c1  then 2∆1<c1<min{ 61 (vH−vL), 41 (vH−vL)−∆1}. Analogous to Proposition 2, the 
best responses in this subgame imply no trade. The continuation payoff is US=0. 
If δ= ∆2c1 then the seller’s continuation payoff is EUS=0. 
Case 2 : Suppose nS(0)=0 and nB(0)=1. 
Given Assumption T2, the seller does not learn anything about v1 from observing bL(0) and 
bH(0). Since v0 is public information in period 1 an uninformed seller knows that v1 is either 
v1L=v0−k or v1H=v0+k . The seller compares the following alternatives.  
(i) If nS(1)=0, then the uninformed seller accounts for the lemons problem and 
chooses s(1)=v1H+δ∆. Trade occurs with probability 0.5, assuming that the indifferent buyer 
opts for partial trade and chooses bL(1)=N and bH(1)=Y. The seller’s continuation payoff is 
EUS=δ∆. (Note, if s(1)=v1L+δ∆ trade may occur with probability 1 but the seller obtains 
EUS=2δ∆−(vH−vL)/2<0 since ∆<(vH−vL)/4.) 
(ii) If nS(1)=1, then the seller chooses sL(1)=vL+δ∆ and sH(1)=vH+δ∆. Assuming that 
the indifferent informed buyer opts for trade and chooses bL(1)=Y and bH(1)=Y, the seller 
gets EUS=2δ∆−c1.  
So if 2δ∆−c1>δ∆, i.e. δ> ∆1c , then the seller acquires information and his continuation 
payoff is EUS=2δ∆−c1. If δ< ∆1c ,  then the seller acquires no information and his continuation 
payoff is EUS=δ∆. If δ= ∆1c , then the seller is indifferent between the two alternatives.  
 
Remark B2 
Assumption T2 is employed to rule out the following considerations. Suppose the quality is a 
random variable and the informed buyer tries to confuse the seller by offering more than the 
outside option D to the seller. For example, if δ≤ ∆1c  and nB(0)=1 then D=δ∆. Suppose 
bL(0)=vL−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)=vH−∆+δ∆+ε. How should the seller respond? If the seller beliefs 
that this signals that the true state is not H, then he should reject the offer. In period 1 he can 
get 2δ∆ by choosing s(1)=vL+δ∆ without concern about the lemons problem. However, if the 
seller beliefs and acts in this way the buyer has an incentive to lie and the seller suffers an 
lemons problem in period 1. (One has to deal with such considerations for nB(0)=1.) This 
assumption excludes such paths as candidates for an equilibrium.  
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Remark B3 
(a) The subsequent steps analyze best responses in period 0 for the cases where δ≤ ∆2c1  (Step 
1), ∆2
c1 ≤δ≤ ∆1c  (Step 2) and δ≥ ∆1c  (Step 3). 
(b) If nB(0)=0, Proposition 2 shows that the uninformed buyer has to account for the 
endogenous lemons problem and submits b(0)≤v0L+∆ since c0< 41 (vH−vL)−∆. 
(c) Given Remark A1, B1 and B2, if the buyer is informed it suffices to focus on offers 
which make the seller indifferent by giving him his continuation payoff.  
 
Step 1 : δ≤ ∆2c1 . 
From Lemma 1, the default option D of the seller is D=0 if nB(0)=0 and D=δ∆ if nB(0)=1.  
 
Step 1.1 (Seller’s best response correspondence in period 0) 
Case 1: nB(0)=0. Define bˆ≡ v0L−∆−2δ∆+2c0< 21 (v0L+v0H)−∆. 
(i) If b= bˆ  then the seller is indifferent between choosing nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N and choosing 
nS(0)=1 and sL(0)=Y and sH(0)=N. If the seller chooses the first response no trade occurs in 
period 0. In period 1 there is also no trade and US=0. If the seller chooses the second 
response then trade occurs in state L and US=(v0L−∆−2δ∆+2c0−(∆−v0L))−c0=−2δ∆+c0≥0 
(since δ≤ ∆2c1 ). In state H no trade occurs in period 0. In period 1 the informed seller gets 
US=2δ∆−c0≤0. So his expected payoff EUS=0. (ii) If b< bˆ , then the best response of the seller 
is to choose nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N and US=0. (iii) If b> bˆ  then the seller chooses nS(0)=1 and 
sL(0)=Y and sH(0)=N and EUS>0.   
Case 2: nB(0)=1. Define Lbˆ ≡v0L−∆+δ∆ and Hbˆ ≡v0H−∆+δ∆. 
Given Remark A2, the seller does not acquire information. It is easy to see that the best 
responses of the uninformed seller are given as follows. (i) If bL(0)= Lbˆ and  bH(0)= Hbˆ  then 
the seller is indifferent between s(0)=Y and s(0)=N. (ii) If bL(0)> Lbˆ and  bH(0)≥ Hbˆ , or 
bL(0)≥ Lbˆ and  bH(0)> Hbˆ  then the seller’s (weakly) best response is to choose s(0)=Y. (iii) If 
bL(0)< Lbˆ and  bH(0)≥ Hbˆ  or bL(0)≥ Lbˆ and  bH(0)< Hbˆ  then the seller chooses s(0)=N.  
 
 31
Step 1.2 (Buyer’s decision in period 0) 
(a) Suppose nB(0)=0. If the buyer chooses alternative (i) then EUB=∆−c0+δ∆. If the 
buyer chooses alternative (ii) then UB=0. If he chooses alternative (iii) then EUB<∆−c0+δ∆. 
(b) Suppose nB(0)=1. It is easy to see that a best response of the buyer is to choose 
bL(0)=v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)=v0H−∆+δ∆ and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. 
Consequently, the buyer compares the alternatives (ai), (aii) and (b).  
Case 1:  If δ< 21  then alternative (b) dominates (ai). The buyer compares (b) with 
(aii). If δ<2− ∆0c , the buyer chooses (b) and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. If δ>2− ∆0c , the buyer chooses (aii) 
and UB=0. If δ=2− ∆0c , the buyer is indifferent between the two alternatives.  
Case 2: If δ> 21 then alternative (ai) dominates (b). The buyer compares (ai) with (aii). 
If δ> ∆0c −1, the buyer chooses alternative (ai) and EUB=∆−c0+δ∆. If δ< ∆0c −1, the buyer 
chooses alternative (aii) and UB=0. If δ= ∆0c −1, the buyer is indifferent between the two 
alternatives.  
Case 3:  If δ= 21 then the buyer compares (ai, aii) with (b). If δ> ∆0c −1, the buyer is 
indifferent between (ai) and (aii) and EUB=∆−c0+δ∆. If δ< ∆0c −1, the buyer chooses 
alternative (b) and UB=0. If δ= ∆0c −1, the buyer is indifferent between the three alternatives.  
 
Step 2:  ∆2
c1 <δ≤ ∆1c . 
The seller’s default option is D=2δ∆−c1 if nB(0)=0 and D=δ∆ if nB(0)=1.  
 
Step 2.1 (Seller’s best response correspondence in period 0) 
Case 1: nB(0)=0. Define bˆ≡v0L−∆+2δ∆−2c1+2c0< 21 (v0L+v0H)−∆. 
(i) If b= bˆ  then the seller is indifferent between choosing nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N and choosing 
nS(0)=1 and sL(0)=Y and sH(0)=N. If the seller chooses the first response no trade occurs in 
period 0. In period 1 the seller gets US=2δ∆−c1. If the seller chooses the second response 
then trade occurs in state L and US=(v0L−∆+2δ∆−2c1+2c0)−(v0L−∆)−c0=2δ∆−2c1+c0>2δ∆−
c1. If v0=v0H, no trade occurs in period 0. In period 1 trade occurs with probability 1 and the 
seller gets US=2δ∆−c0. So his expected payoff  is EUS=2δ∆−c1. (ii) If b< bˆ , then the best 
response of the seller is to choose nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N and US=2δ∆−c1. (iii) If b> bˆ  then the 
seller chooses nS(0)=1 and sL(0)=Y and sH(0)=N and EUS>2δ∆−c1.   
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Case 2: nB(0)=1. See Step 1.1 Case 2.  
 
Step 2.2 (Buyer’s decision in period 0) 
(a) Suppose nB(0)=0. If the buyer chooses alternative (i) then EUB=0.5(v0L+∆−(v0L−
∆+2δ∆−2c1+2c0))=∆−c0−δ∆+c1. If the buyer chooses alternative (ii) then EUB=0. If the 
buyer chooses alternative (iii) then EUB<∆−c0−δ∆+c1. 
(b) Suppose nB(0)=1. Then the buyer chooses bL(0)=v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)=v0H−∆+δ∆, 
and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆.  
Consequently, the buyer compares the alternatives (ai), (aii) and (b).  
Case 1:  If δ> ∆−− 10 cc1 , then (aii) dominates (ai). So alternatives (b) and (aii) remain. 
If δ> ∆− 10c2 , the buyer chooses alternative (aii) and UB=0. If δ< ∆− 10c2 , the buyer chooses 
alternative (b) and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. If δ= ∆− 10c2 , the buyer is indifferent between the two 
alternatives. 
Case 2:  If δ< ∆−− 10 cc1 , then (ai) dominates (aii). So alternatives (b) and (ai) remain. If 
c1>∆ then the buyer chooses (ai) and EUB=∆−c0−δ∆+c1. If c1<∆ then the buyer chooses (b) 
and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. If c1=∆ the buyer is indifferent between the two alternatives. 
Case 3:  If δ= ∆−− 10 cc1 , then the buyer is indifferent between (ai) and (aii). If c1>∆ 
then the buyer chooses (ai) or (aii) and EUB=∆−c0−δ∆+c1. If c1>∆ then the buyer chooses (b) 
and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆. If c1=∆ the buyer is indifferent between three alternatives. 
 
Step 3:  δ> ∆1c . 
The seller’s default option is D=2δ∆−c1 for both nB(0)=0 and nB(0)=1.  
 
Step 3.1 (Seller’s best response correspondence in period 0) 
Case 1: nB(0)=0. See Step 2.1, Case 1.  
Case 2: nB(0)=1. Define Lbˆ ≡v0L−∆+2δ∆−c1 and Hbˆ ≡v0H−∆+2δ∆−c1. 
As before, the best responses of the seller are given as follows. (i) If bL(0)= Lbˆ and  
bH(0)= Hbˆ  then the seller is indifferent between s(0)=Y and s(0)=N. (ii) If bL(0)> Lbˆ and  
bH(0)≥ Hbˆ  or bL(0)≥ Lbˆ and  bH(0)> Hbˆ  then the seller’s (weakly) best response is to choose 
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s(0)=Y. (iii) If bL(0)< Lbˆ and  bH(0)≥ Hbˆ  or bL(0)≥ Lbˆ and  bH(0)< Hbˆ  then the seller chooses 
s(0)=N.  
 
Step 3.2 (Buyer’s decision in period 0) 
(a) Suppose nB(0)=0. If the buyer chooses alternative (i) then EUB=∆−c0−δ∆+0.5c1. If 
the buyer chooses the alternative (ii) then UB=0. If the buyer chooses alternative (iii) then 
EUB<∆−c0−δ∆+0.5c1. 
(b) Suppose nB(0)=1. Then the buyer chooses bL(0)=v0L−∆+2δ∆−c1 and bH(0)=v0H−
∆+2δ∆−c1 and UB=2∆−c0−2δ∆+c1. 
Consequently, the buyer compares the alternatives (ai), (aii) and (b). It is easy to see 
that alternative (b) dominates alternative (ai). So alternatives (aii) and (b) remain. If 
δ> ∆−− 2 cc 101 , the buyer chooses alternative (aii) and UB=0. If δ< ∆−− 2 cc 101 , the buyer chooses 
alternative (b). If δ= ∆−− 2 cc 101 , the buyer is indifferent between the two alternatives.  
 
Step 4 (Equilibrium paths) 
If δ<min{ ∆2c1 ,2− ∆0c , 21 } then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer 
chooses nB(0)=1 and bL(0)=v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)≥v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0L; and bL(0)≥v0L−∆+δ∆ 
and bH(0)=v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0H. The seller chooses nS(0)=0, s(0)=Y. In any SPE trade occurs 
in period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆ and US=δ∆. (Proposition 7(ai)) 
If 2− ∆0c <δ<min{ 21 , ∆2c1 } then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer 
chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)<v0L−∆−2δ∆+2c0 and the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N. In 
period 1 the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and s(1)>v1H+δ∆−2c1 and the buyer chooses nB(1)=0 and 
b(1)=N. No SPE with trade exists. (Proposition 10(i)) 
If max{ ∆0
c −1, 21 }<δ< ∆2c1  then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer 
chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)=v0L−∆+2c0−δ∆ and the seller chooses nS(0)=1 and sL(0)=Y and 
sH(0)=N. If  v0=v0L trade occurs. If v0=v0H, there is disagreement. In period 1 the informed 
seller chooses nS(1)=0 and sL(1)=v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)≤v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1L;  and sL(1)≤v1L+δ∆ and 
sH(1)=v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1H. The buyer chooses nB(1)=0 and b(1)=Y. In any SPE trade occurs 
with probability 0.5 in period 0 and EUB=∆+δ∆−c0 and EUS=0. (Proposition 8) 
If 21 <δ<min{ ∆0c −1, ∆2c1 } then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer 
chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)<v0L−∆−2δ∆+2c0 and the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N. In 
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period 1 the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and s(1)>v1H+δ∆−2c1 and the buyer chooses nB(1)=0 and 
b(1)=N. No SPE with trade exists. (Proposition 10(ii)) 
If max{ ∆2
c1 , ∆
−− 10 cc1 , ∆− 10c2 }<δ< ∆1c  then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 
the buyer chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)<v0L−∆+2δ∆−c1+2c0 and the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and 
s(0)=N. In period 1, the seller chooses nS(1)=1 and sL(1)=v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)≤v1H+δ∆ if 
v1=v1L; and sL(1)≤v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)= v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1H. The buyer chooses nB(1)=0, b(1)=Y. 
In any SPE trade occurs in period 1 and UB=0 and US=2δ∆−c1. (Proposition 6(ii)) 
If max{ ∆2
c1 , ∆
−− 10 cc1 ,}<δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆− 10c2 }, then the set of PE is given as follows. In 
period 0 the buyer chooses nB(0)=1 and bL(0)=v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)≥v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0L; and 
bL(0)≥v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)=v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0H. The seller chooses nS(0)=0, s(0)=Y. In any 
SPE trade occurs in period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆ and US=δ∆. (Proposition 7(aii)) 
If max ∆2
c1 <δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆−− 10 cc1 } and c1<∆ then the set of PE is given as follows. In 
period 0 the buyer chooses nB(0)=1 and bL(0)=v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)≥v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0L; and 
bL(0)≥v0L−∆+δ∆ and bH(0)=v0H−∆+δ∆ if v0=v0H. The seller chooses nS(0)=0, s(0)=Y. In any 
SPE trade occurs in period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−δ∆ and US=δ∆. (Proposition 7(aiii)) 
If max ∆2
c1 <δ<min{ ∆1c , ∆−− 10 cc1 } and c1>∆ then the set of PE is given as follows. In 
period 0 the buyer chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)=v0L−∆+2δ∆−2c1+2c0. The seller chooses 
nS(0)=1 and sL(0)=Y and sH(0)=N. If v0=v0H, there is disagreement. In period 1 the informed 
seller chooses nS(1)=0 and sL(1)=v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)≤v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1L;  and sL(1)≤v1L+δ∆ and 
sH(1)=v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1H. The buyer chooses nB(1)=0 and b(1)=Y. In any SPE trade occurs 
with probability 0.5 in period 0 and EUB=∆−c0−δ∆+c1 and EUS=2δ∆−c1. (Proposition 9) 
If ∆1
c <δ< ∆−− 2 cc 101  then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer chooses 
nB(0)=1 and bL(0)=v0L−∆+2δ∆−c1 and bH(0)≥v0H−∆+2δ∆−c1 if v0=v0L; and bL(0)≥v0L−
∆+2δ∆−c1 and bH(0)=v0H−∆+2δ∆−c1 if v0=v0H. The seller chooses nS(0)=0, s(0)=Y. In any 
SPE trade occurs in period 0 and UB=2∆−c0−2δ∆+c1 and US=2δ∆−c1. (Proposition 7(b)) 
If δ>max{ ∆−− 2 cc 101 , ∆1c } then the set of PE is given as follows. In period 0 the buyer 
chooses nB(0)=0 and b(0)<v0L−∆+2δ∆−c1+2c0 and the seller chooses nS(0)=0 and s(0)=N. In 
period 1, the seller chooses nS(1)=1 and sL(1)=v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)≤v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1L; and 
sL(1)≤v1L+δ∆ and sH(1)= v1H+δ∆ if v1=v1H. The buyer chooses nB(1)=0, b(1)=Y. In any SPE 
trade occurs in period 1 and UB=0 and US=2δ∆−c1. (Proposition 6(i)) QED 
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